I've always wondered: if you take the cause of each CVE, look at underlying cause of that & repeat, how many essential root problems would you be left with?
"Can't do math" (off-by-1 errors etc)
"Sanitize your inputs" (escape sequences, parsing etc)
"What are you referencing?" (null pointers, use-after-free etc)
and error handling. Plain error codes bubbling up a call stack, or bypassing that somehow which may violate program structure.
"sanitize your inputs" means you have to know what the output is ahead of time, and that you'll never output any other way. It also means false positives. It can actually be harmful if done wrong (double escaping, escaping that certain systems don't understand) but there's some basic forms that probably aren't too bad. It's generally pointless, though, since...
"escape your outputs" works for all data and is actually achievable. It means even escaping data that was never an "input" from the outside the system, even developer-created data, which absolutely can (and does) cause problems to ignore.
These are bug classes that are handled by reasonable programming languages since decades ago, so can be reduced to failing in choice of tools and risk management practices.
But root cause is a flawed concept, there's almost never one root cause.
A common one is using an attacker-controllable length field to read or write memory. I think it sort of falls into sanitize your inputs, but typically this occurs _while_ parsing.
time of check/time of use issues _might_ be considered "What are you referencing" but the arrow of time feels so important there that I'd consider it its own class
> I've always wondered: if you take the cause of each CVE, look at underlying cause of that & repeat, how many essential root problems would you be left with?
It's almost always memory safety violations. The rest are basically application-level bugs, like not properly checking inputs.
And why would that be different than, say, asserting "You can't have debian/Linux exposed to the internet" (which we all agree is silly)? NAS are just your usual breed of Linux distros, and reputable brands come pre-hardened (it's easy to laugh at Synology, but they were as quick, if not faster to patch node/php and now nginx than most mainstream distros, and the bunch of kernel exploits relating to unsound crypto utilities didn't affect them to begin with because the modules were not compiled in).
Synology isn't a panacea (they put themselves in an awkward position with their btrfs fork, with constraints them to stay on an obsolete kernel branch and do a ton of patch shuffling and backporting), but is a much better posture to start homelabing from than, say, a raspbian in a shoebox.
> And why would that be different than, say, asserting "You can't have debian/Linux exposed to the internet"
I would assert that if you exposed any services directly to the internet without a justifiable reason. I don't think exposing a NAS management interface to the public internet is justifiable.
Most non-security/networking appliances don't take security seriously enough to even contemplate it.
Most NAS protocols and their implementations have an awful track record and assume to be operating on a secure local network, e.g. SMB and NFS.
My rule is that appliances should never be accessible from untrusted networks and regular server systems (e.g. debian) only expose the minimum set of services that must be publicly accessible, like a public website.
Everything else, all management web uis and other non-public services are only accessible via Wireguard or mTLS as a fallback option when supported by client software.
I set up two Synology for someone who needed to backup files. One unit at his office and one at home. He does 90% of his work at the office, but wants to be able to access them at home or weekends if needed. He works with very large video files and a cloud cost per month for 8-10tb and growing wasn't in his budget (couldn't afford it).
Synology was a perfect solution. Low-cost unit, stick a 15gb drive in it and do again for second unit. DSM is a breeze to work with and the built in rsync was pretty easy to setup and has been working seamlessly for a year now.
Just free willy opening ports and sticking a default setup NAS to the internet, I agree, is asking to be hacked. Tailscale was my preferred way to get them connected but there is no Tailscale Synology client, and if I remember, would required hacks to get one on it and working. Use long passwords for the user is first start. Then on both use the security settings to only accept the ONE IP from each other, even though only one of them is actually exposed to the internet. Also select the settings to install any security updates automatically. Logs show this has all been working good to protect the units. The only catch so far is the IP of his house changed once in the year, being it isn't static, but simply changing it on the sending unit to new one fixed it in about 3 minutes.
I'm thinking of replicating this setup for myself to backup all PC's and phones in my household and syncing to another unit I set up at my relative's house in another state while I visit over the holidays. It pays for itself in short time compared to a cloud provider.
I'm curious now after this CVE how long it will take the units to auto update to newest version after it becomes available to manually install.
There is an official Tailscale package [0], although you might need to schedule a task for upgrades and fixing noetwork configuration on restart.
Anyway, I bought one for a client past year, and I won't buy nor recommend one ever again. It's a mess security and technically wise.
They're on a 4.4 kernel (even on recent devices), supposedly backporting security bugfixes. That also means that on a kernel so old you don't have the networking performance improvements and features of the last 10 years.
They're using a btrfs version they forked 10 years ago that they're maintaining out of tree, that also doesn't have any of the new features, and that's not compatible with recent btrfs versions. On top of that, they self built a super messy ACL system that's using a vmtouch version also from 10 years ago.
They always have super outdated libraries. They've been using PHP7.4 (EOLed 4 years ago) until past winter, and PHP8.1 until this summer.
I take a look to the running daemons and... their SMB daemon is based on 4.15.13 (from 2022). Nginx 1.23.1 (from 2022). chrony (it just says DEVELOPMENT version). net-snmp 5.9.3 (2022). rsync 3.1.2 (2015). Postgres 11.11 (2021). Not fun.
And I'm talking about a supported device that got a major OS upgrade this summer.
With this wave of AI security attacks, they don't have much time until something huge appears. Either that, or they use that AI to accelerate going back to mainline versions of the software they use.
Compared to faffing around with certificates, Wireguard or if you're lazy, Tailscale, is a breeze to setup.
Generate the config, one per client, setup the client to only route specific RFC1918 networks and disable on well known wifi networks, and that's it. It literally works for years without any maintenance.
Tailscale is easier (presumably), but also puts a corporate entity between you and your data.
Tailscale is ridiculously easy, and headscale is a thing. It doesn't support everything corporate Tailscale does, but it covers the basics of "get me into my network from anywhere". You can run it on a $1/month VPS that has a public IPv4 address.
I don't work with computers professionally, at all. It still only took me about 2 hours to get the VPS, get Debian going on it, set up headscale, and connect to it from home. Do I still use corporate Tailscale? Yes, it has some features that aren't beautifully supported on headscale, and so for the moment I'm fine with that. But I do have my backup plan in place if I need it.
Personally I’d rather let Tailscale manage securing the public-facing service than use Headscale. Tailnet Lock seems like a good compromise. And as much as I’d like to use it, I don’t trust Tailscale SSH.
Worth noting the sentence at the top of that page:
> Updated 2026-10-27. The researchers thank Tailscale Inc. for a rapid and substantive response to this report: fixes landed in the project's public git repositories (tailscale/tailscale and tailscale/gliderssh, branch main) and shipped in v1.104.4 (tagged 2026-10-27). Per-finding status is carried by the finding headings and the mitigation matrix.
> I don't work with computers professionally, at all.
You trust yourself with a VPS and correctly configuring a beast such a Debian?
I don't mean to be harsh but even as a professional developer I'm frequently humbled by our grumpy sysadmins on (to me) arcane stuff I didn't knew existed.
A corporate in the control plane is not an issue for me. But what if their infrastructure is compromised?
The VPN companies are prime targets and have large attack surface. Even bigger companies are frequently compromised. It's a matter of time before it becomes publicly known.
VPNs these days are far easier to configure than mTLS (which often need proxies on both server and client side to handle the TLS terminations and needing to worry more with certificate lifecycle).
mTLS is a better option for distributed systems (service to service mesh networks for attestation of workload identities) instead of for human users.
I want to make sure every picture I take will be backed up to the NAS.
Do I turn on the VPN when I take a picture and turn it off when finished? Every time?
What if I need multiple VPN's? Living in a country that has a bad geoip reputation, it's already a struggle of switching on and off for individual websites to work.
The thing that’s nice about using WireGuard here is that it works for any app on my phone; they don’t have to individually support it and I don’t have to individually configure certs for them.
I have one on-demand VPN with a list of internal IPs to route.
How many mTLS configs are anything but all-or-nothing access? It is so common for an app to slap mTLS on the endpoints and make the rule "anyone with a valid cert is admin on this API; anyone else gets 401." This is a step back towards a superuser/regular-user model.
Now if you're going to use mTLS as the basis for mature authn/authz, that's a different story. But I never see anyone do that.
authn and authz are separate. mTLS is used first for identity attestation (amongst also establishing a secure channel), what you’re allowed to do after you’ve proven the identity of both client/server is authz.
If the operator wants to provide admin access after mTLS is established as you described, then that may be a design decision, but that’s not on mTLS fault and the same can be said about other forms of identity authn (password, certificates, biometric, etc)
I agree with you that mTLS is for authn, not authz, but GP is saying that it’s commonly misused. If a tool is often held wrong, it’s not a very good tool for humans.
I’m disputing that the tool (mTLS) is not commonly at fault for being misused, authz (rather the lack of it) is being misused and misunderstood with its conflation of authn.
The tool (authn a la mTLS) is working as intended.
The tooling ecosystem around it matters, the language documentation around it matters. It’s rarer to see documented examples of mTLS where the identity is then accessed and (for example) checked against a users db. It’s even rarer to see examples of (e.g transporting signed claims about a user via mTLS cert).
Let’s use JWT OIDC token as another example of a technology used to provide authn. The JWT has standard structure for sending authenticated claims about a user (such as subject ID, email, email verification state, scopes) that can subsequently be used by an authz layer after authn is completed. My point isn’t that OIDC is better than mTLS, but that the design makes it clear to handoff to the authorization layer so there is less ambiguity about what to do after authn.
Yes, this I absolutely agree that JWT is simpler to work with by virtue of remaining on http layer 7 and parsing claims out of JSON compared to working with extracting identity and other embeddings from x509 and lifting this out from the TLS layer. OIDC exceptionally so as it’s purposely designed with passing identities as its sole purpose.
I just take issue (maybe pedantically so or I admittedly misunderstood the GPs original point) with blanket statements that no one uses mTLS for just authn but for authz also so that makes it a bad tool. There is no authz and that should be completely apparent after first authentication and logically raise to the developer with next steps to extract the identity. We’re disagreeing on the basis that a human’s incorrect conflation that it does provide authz should/shouldn’t be attributed to mTLS.
We are saying the same thing. mtls is fine for authn. But nobody actually uses it for just that. They use it for both authn and authz. The authz policy is almost always just "identity != null".
If I told you not to use a power drill as a hammer, you wouldn't claim I'm saying the power drill is at fault for being a bad hammer.
There's a third-party repository for Synology that includes WireGuard. I've been using it for over a year now and it works great. (Presently posting this from Chenzhou, China where I have full access to my US-based Synology NAS courtesy of WireGuard and WSTunnel.)
Strongly agree, Tailscale / WG is the way go. Unless something needs to be available to randos on the Internet, in which case mTLS is still a huge headache.
mTLS is the one that requires a client certificate. right? It can be quite difficult to get protocols other than HTTPS to behave well with that, mostly because the application has to worry about it and many don't bother.
WireGuard is also very much like SSH private keys.
A basic config to set up a VPN that only adds access to services on the VPN itself is very short and simple, both for WireGuard server and for WireGuard clients.
You can run the WireGuard server from your home computer. For example on your NAS machine itself or some other machine you have at home. And open the port for WireGuard to the outside.
Also some routers can run WireGuard server on the router. For example Mikrotik routers have WireGuard server built in and ready to configure [0]. Routers running OpenWrt can too [1].
Or you can rent a small VPS and use that as your WireGuard server.
And then, any which where you run the WireGuard server, run the WireGuard client on your laptops, iOS and Android devices, and connect client apps using VPN internal IP addresses. And your NAS etc too, if the WireGuard server isn’t running on the NAS machine itself.
It really is quite quick to set up with server and all clients across devices.
The only real hurdle is that on iOS you have to turn the VPN back on manually after reboot and which is sometimes easily forgotten if you only use your self hosted services occasionally. But you quickly realize oh right I have to open the WireGuard app and turn on the VPN again whenever you try to use one of your self hosted services and the client isn’t connecting.
I think if you want mTLS to have any significance, the application itself has to support it, otherwise you're just doing a VPN again and there's no good reason to use it over Wireguard (especially because an mTLS server will respond to port scans and a Wireguard server will not)
WireGuard does not even respond at all[0][1] to unauthorized clients, so the forwarded port stays invisible to illegitimate peers.
AFAIK the SSH server MUST give a response[2], so network scanners can still find their targets. DoS mitigation is generally performed by a hosting provider or an upstream service.
You should design your home server with two layers of security. The actual server and apps should be secured in the same way you would a public application, and then wireguard on top. That way an exploit needs to compromise both layers at the same time. And with auto updates enabled the chance of that happening is low.
I don’t even bother with wireguard or tailscale anymore. They will have vulnerabilities discovered, if they don’t already. Not all vulns are made public.
Nothing gets through the firewall anymore. So now my only vulnerability (I hope) is the firewall, OPNsense.
/r/synology has been a sea of compromise posts these past weeks.
I personally think Synology are mostly at most fault here though - they shouldn’t be making it so easy for clueless users to do this. It’s basically advertised as a feature.
Very, very few consumer products make it that easy to set up and tie your own noose.
I agree. However, I also want to share photo albums with family and friends with Photo Station and/or Immich. I may also want to run Jellyfin so the same family and friends can watch my collection of... 'Linux ISOs'. Do I simply pinhole those TCP ports through my router and "hope for the best," or is there a better solution?
Run them in containers, put them behind a reverse proxy that does TLS, point fail2ban at the proxy logs. Use strong passwords. Take backups. Life is full of risk, learn to live with it.
Wait out the current wave of madness. In a year or so we will have the most secure software ever seen. We also might start to see servers with Memory Tagging to block exploits not yet found.
In Synology's case a lot of their stuff is just legacy even though they don't describe it that way, I think most of their apps have not been worked on for years. At this point I wonder if they even have much more than a skeleton crew working on their software at all.
So they put also some other breaking changes in this upgrade, like offloading the H265 decoding on clients instead of the server. This is very bad taste
with the amount of CVEs (self-)hosting becomes a chore tbh; I mean technically it's a good thing that software is getting patched but I think I'm gonna just shutdown few projects (one of which is exposed on Synology's VM via cloudflare tunnel) - I'm getting _patching fatigue_ already
If you've got an ancient unit like mine where the fix status is "Ongoing" :/ Synology's advised mitigation is to "Remove the OAuth Service Package", i.e. find it from the Package Centre off the main menu, and click Uninstall.
I've never used OAuth, it looked completely unconfigured. But it's the subject of this CVE and seems to be installed by default .
Run some flavour of nginx, I used NPM as it has a nice web gui in one container, and run plex in another container. Add reverse proxy rule in NPM to route traffic to plex.
Thats one simple way, another way is to use the built-in synology reverse proxy but... that has also had a vulnerability this week.
I have a DNS wildcard in cloudflare and a more complicated setup with plex on a subdomain, and authelia integrated into NPM to authenticate users before they get through the npm rule.
If my understanding of the stack is correct, this is probably better, but not a step-change in security - if Plex is vulnerable, it's going to be problematic regardless of the underlying host.
* Plex packages on Plex are more-or-less current, but you can probably better stay current on a non-DSM OS.
* If you're exposing Plex to the internet, the relevant surface area is basically just Plex itself. You can probably better manage defense-in-depth of the underlying system on a non-DSM OS in the case of a Plex vulnerability.
Kind of wild to say there is a critical security vulnerability but the update isn’t out yet. Honestly would have preferred they didn’t tell me until it was patched
The oldest one I have still serving data at home is an 1813+ running DSM 7.1.1-42962 Update 9. It's inside my network and just does SMB1 and AFP for my retro computer collection and serves as a dumping ground for security camera footage. Really curious when Syno's going to finally cut this thing off from updates since it's been years since 7.2 came out and it didn't get it.
I just recently took a 415+ off the internet (it had Photo Station and Apache only exposed to the outside). I did the "resistor mod" on its JTAG connector to save its Atom from literally frying itself and it's also still working fine. As usual, the hardware far outlives the software.
I know this is not relevant to the topic at hand but tangentially related:
Does anyone know of any UGREEN UGOS alternatives? I don't mind the terminal but friends prefer a web GUI and for some mundane stuff I too have started to (begrudgingly) prefer it.
Since we’re off topic already - I do have the dxp6800 but I swapped the OS after first boot. Might be worth it to get the hardware but invest in say HexOS or similar
What did you swap it for? I don't like the direction Synology is going, so my 1621+ is going to be my last one from them (but it's easily got another decade before I think about replacing it), and I'd like to be able to recommend something that's about as easy as Synology and DSM for the technical-but-not-that-technical friends and family.
"Can't do math" (off-by-1 errors etc)
"Sanitize your inputs" (escape sequences, parsing etc)
"What are you referencing?" (null pointers, use-after-free etc)
and error handling. Plain error codes bubbling up a call stack, or bypassing that somehow which may violate program structure.
How many of these fundamental issues are there?
https://top10.owasp.org/2025/
https://community.owasp.org/vulnerabilities/
OWASP already covers this
"escape your outputs" works for all data and is actually achievable. It means even escaping data that was never an "input" from the outside the system, even developer-created data, which absolutely can (and does) cause problems to ignore.
1. Failure to differentiate data from instructions
2. Business logic flaws
3. Insecure operating environment
4. Incorrect use of cryptography
It's what still trips half the people working on security of LLM applications.
Execute without read is not supported so much though.
Aside from language level enforcement (Java/Rust/...)
I mean, I'm kinda kidding, but #1 is #1.
1. Error that causes security problems
What is being secured (as in, whose interests), and from who?
Security is all nice until one day you find yourself being seen as threat actor. See e.g. all the modern computing devices you "own".
But root cause is a flawed concept, there's almost never one root cause.
I'd phrase that as "know your data access ordering," and include races.
It's almost always memory safety violations. The rest are basically application-level bugs, like not properly checking inputs.
CVEs are a big deal, but humans are the real vulnerability
Synology isn't a panacea (they put themselves in an awkward position with their btrfs fork, with constraints them to stay on an obsolete kernel branch and do a ton of patch shuffling and backporting), but is a much better posture to start homelabing from than, say, a raspbian in a shoebox.
I would assert that if you exposed any services directly to the internet without a justifiable reason. I don't think exposing a NAS management interface to the public internet is justifiable.
Most non-security/networking appliances don't take security seriously enough to even contemplate it.
Most NAS protocols and their implementations have an awful track record and assume to be operating on a secure local network, e.g. SMB and NFS.
My rule is that appliances should never be accessible from untrusted networks and regular server systems (e.g. debian) only expose the minimum set of services that must be publicly accessible, like a public website.
Everything else, all management web uis and other non-public services are only accessible via Wireguard or mTLS as a fallback option when supported by client software.
Synology was a perfect solution. Low-cost unit, stick a 15gb drive in it and do again for second unit. DSM is a breeze to work with and the built in rsync was pretty easy to setup and has been working seamlessly for a year now.
Just free willy opening ports and sticking a default setup NAS to the internet, I agree, is asking to be hacked. Tailscale was my preferred way to get them connected but there is no Tailscale Synology client, and if I remember, would required hacks to get one on it and working. Use long passwords for the user is first start. Then on both use the security settings to only accept the ONE IP from each other, even though only one of them is actually exposed to the internet. Also select the settings to install any security updates automatically. Logs show this has all been working good to protect the units. The only catch so far is the IP of his house changed once in the year, being it isn't static, but simply changing it on the sending unit to new one fixed it in about 3 minutes.
I'm thinking of replicating this setup for myself to backup all PC's and phones in my household and syncing to another unit I set up at my relative's house in another state while I visit over the holidays. It pays for itself in short time compared to a cloud provider.
I'm curious now after this CVE how long it will take the units to auto update to newest version after it becomes available to manually install.
Anyway, I bought one for a client past year, and I won't buy nor recommend one ever again. It's a mess security and technically wise.
They're on a 4.4 kernel (even on recent devices), supposedly backporting security bugfixes. That also means that on a kernel so old you don't have the networking performance improvements and features of the last 10 years.
They're using a btrfs version they forked 10 years ago that they're maintaining out of tree, that also doesn't have any of the new features, and that's not compatible with recent btrfs versions. On top of that, they self built a super messy ACL system that's using a vmtouch version also from 10 years ago.
They always have super outdated libraries. They've been using PHP7.4 (EOLed 4 years ago) until past winter, and PHP8.1 until this summer.
I take a look to the running daemons and... their SMB daemon is based on 4.15.13 (from 2022). Nginx 1.23.1 (from 2022). chrony (it just says DEVELOPMENT version). net-snmp 5.9.3 (2022). rsync 3.1.2 (2015). Postgres 11.11 (2021). Not fun.
And I'm talking about a supported device that got a major OS upgrade this summer.
With this wave of AI security attacks, they don't have much time until something huge appears. Either that, or they use that AI to accelerate going back to mainline versions of the software they use.
--
The thing even self-updates.
I think the answer is mTLS.
Unfortunately, Synology apps don't support it.
Generate the config, one per client, setup the client to only route specific RFC1918 networks and disable on well known wifi networks, and that's it. It literally works for years without any maintenance.
Tailscale is easier (presumably), but also puts a corporate entity between you and your data.
I don't work with computers professionally, at all. It still only took me about 2 hours to get the VPS, get Debian going on it, set up headscale, and connect to it from home. Do I still use corporate Tailscale? Yes, it has some features that aren't beautifully supported on headscale, and so for the moment I'm fine with that. But I do have my backup plan in place if I need it.
I have a headscale instance, on one of those $1/mo VPSes, and I don't intend to use it unless I have to. But if I have to, it's there.
> Updated 2026-10-27. The researchers thank Tailscale Inc. for a rapid and substantive response to this report: fixes landed in the project's public git repositories (tailscale/tailscale and tailscale/gliderssh, branch main) and shipped in v1.104.4 (tagged 2026-10-27). Per-finding status is carried by the finding headings and the mitigation matrix.
You trust yourself with a VPS and correctly configuring a beast such a Debian?
I don't mean to be harsh but even as a professional developer I'm frequently humbled by our grumpy sysadmins on (to me) arcane stuff I didn't knew existed.
The VPN companies are prime targets and have large attack surface. Even bigger companies are frequently compromised. It's a matter of time before it becomes publicly known.
mTLS is a better option for distributed systems (service to service mesh networks for attestation of workload identities) instead of for human users.
Do I turn on the VPN when I take a picture and turn it off when finished? Every time?
What if I need multiple VPN's? Living in a country that has a bad geoip reputation, it's already a struggle of switching on and off for individual websites to work.
It's not 2016 anymore...
https://github.com/alangrainger/immich-public-proxy/blob/mai...
I have one on-demand VPN with a list of internal IPs to route.
Now if you're going to use mTLS as the basis for mature authn/authz, that's a different story. But I never see anyone do that.
If the operator wants to provide admin access after mTLS is established as you described, then that may be a design decision, but that’s not on mTLS fault and the same can be said about other forms of identity authn (password, certificates, biometric, etc)
The tool (authn a la mTLS) is working as intended.
Let’s use JWT OIDC token as another example of a technology used to provide authn. The JWT has standard structure for sending authenticated claims about a user (such as subject ID, email, email verification state, scopes) that can subsequently be used by an authz layer after authn is completed. My point isn’t that OIDC is better than mTLS, but that the design makes it clear to handoff to the authorization layer so there is less ambiguity about what to do after authn.
I just take issue (maybe pedantically so or I admittedly misunderstood the GPs original point) with blanket statements that no one uses mTLS for just authn but for authz also so that makes it a bad tool. There is no authz and that should be completely apparent after first authentication and logically raise to the developer with next steps to extract the identity. We’re disagreeing on the basis that a human’s incorrect conflation that it does provide authz should/shouldn’t be attributed to mTLS.
If I told you not to use a power drill as a hammer, you wouldn't claim I'm saying the power drill is at fault for being a bad hammer.
mTLS prevents connecting to the application without valid cert.
Sure the reverse proxy handling the mtls can be exploited, but so can any VPN server as well.
A basic config to set up a VPN that only adds access to services on the VPN itself is very short and simple, both for WireGuard server and for WireGuard clients.
You can run the WireGuard server from your home computer. For example on your NAS machine itself or some other machine you have at home. And open the port for WireGuard to the outside.
Also some routers can run WireGuard server on the router. For example Mikrotik routers have WireGuard server built in and ready to configure [0]. Routers running OpenWrt can too [1].
Or you can rent a small VPS and use that as your WireGuard server.
And then, any which where you run the WireGuard server, run the WireGuard client on your laptops, iOS and Android devices, and connect client apps using VPN internal IP addresses. And your NAS etc too, if the WireGuard server isn’t running on the NAS machine itself.
It really is quite quick to set up with server and all clients across devices.
The only real hurdle is that on iOS you have to turn the VPN back on manually after reboot and which is sometimes easily forgotten if you only use your self hosted services occasionally. But you quickly realize oh right I have to open the WireGuard app and turn on the VPN again whenever you try to use one of your self hosted services and the client isn’t connecting.
[0]: https://manual.mikrotik.com/docs/virtual-private-networks/wi...
[1]: https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/services/vpn/wireguard/b...
AFAIK the SSH server MUST give a response[2], so network scanners can still find their targets. DoS mitigation is generally performed by a hosting provider or an upstream service.
[0]: https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/#dos-mitigation
[1]: https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf (5.1 Silence is a Virtue)
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4252/#section-5.1
Nothing gets through the firewall anymore. So now my only vulnerability (I hope) is the firewall, OPNsense.
I've been using Synology for ~12 years, and I've never exposed my NAS to the Internet.
I personally think Synology are mostly at most fault here though - they shouldn’t be making it so easy for clueless users to do this. It’s basically advertised as a feature.
Very, very few consumer products make it that easy to set up and tie your own noose.
Let the family members have their own Linux ISO collections or let them pay streaming scammers.
I am not a big family guy as you can notice. But in my defense no one really cares about my photo albums or ISO files I like.
Wrong idea: not even a few hours later was it mining bitcoins.
Fortunately only the system partition was affected and I could restore it fully.
Prepare and parameterize statements you guys.
I've never used OAuth, it looked completely unconfigured. But it's the subject of this CVE and seems to be installed by default .
Thats one simple way, another way is to use the built-in synology reverse proxy but... that has also had a vulnerability this week.
I have a DNS wildcard in cloudflare and a more complicated setup with plex on a subdomain, and authelia integrated into NPM to authenticate users before they get through the npm rule.
* Plex packages on Plex are more-or-less current, but you can probably better stay current on a non-DSM OS. * If you're exposing Plex to the internet, the relevant surface area is basically just Plex itself. You can probably better manage defense-in-depth of the underlying system on a non-DSM OS in the case of a Plex vulnerability.
I just recently took a 415+ off the internet (it had Photo Station and Apache only exposed to the outside). I did the "resistor mod" on its JTAG connector to save its Atom from literally frying itself and it's also still working fine. As usual, the hardware far outlives the software.
Does anyone know of any UGREEN UGOS alternatives? I don't mind the terminal but friends prefer a web GUI and for some mundane stuff I too have started to (begrudgingly) prefer it.
I'm curious if they support mTLS too?
That's never the answer.
What's your plan for avoiding having attackers find vulnerabilities on Friday, or exploiting them on Saturday/Sunday?
Unplanned is of course unfortunate
It seems pretty improbable that this is a planned release given that when they put out the advisory there wasn't even a patched version available.
EDIT: I just checked and there still isn't a patched release available.