This is why I use, in security critical contents of my software (where the numbers have to be computationally infeasible to produce), a type of random number generator called an XOF (extendable-output function).
It takes entropy from multiple different sources, makes it all input to the XOF, then the XOF uses cryptography to output a stream that has as much entropy as the combined entropy of all of its sources of randomness. So if an XOF, for example, takes 100 runs of rdrand16, along with the system time in microseconds and the number of milliseconds between receiving 100 packets over the network, the XOF will output a completely random stream without artifacts like never returning 0x0000, even if rdrand16 never outputs 0x0000.
This is not the first RNG bug on Zen 2, I recall after I first got mine that some application or other would quit immediately at startup because rdrand always returned -1, i.e. all 1s. It was fixed with a microcode update.
Do we now learn that they fixed "always generate all 1s" with "never generate all 0s"??
EDIT: I've been unable to reproduce the problem on my CPU, FWIW. It's a Ryzen 5 3600.
EDIT2: OK, update, I can reproduce it with rdrand16, rdrand32 is fine but rdrand16 can never generate all 0s. So my CPU does have this problem!
I think that one is referencing a run of six 9's in the digits of pi, which occur much earlier than one would "expect" them to show up in a truly uniform distribution.
Yes it does. rdrand32()%65535 was my first attempt, and generated zeroes at about the expected rate, that's why I initially erroneously thought my CPU did not have this problem.
According to Theodore Ts there was pressure from Intel engineers to let /dev/random rely only on the RDRAND instruction.
"
I am so glad I resisted pressure from Intel engineers to let /dev/random rely only on the RDRAND instruction. To quote from the article below:
"By this year, the Sigint Enabling Project had found ways inside some of the encryption chips that scramble information for businesses and governments, either by working with chipmakers to insert back doors...."
Relying solely on the hardware random number generator which is using an implementation sealed inside a chip which is impossible to audit is a BAD idea.
"
Putting a backdoor into CSPRNG is a favored way to break crypto, for example Dual_EC_DRBG.
"
Weaknesses in the cryptographic security of the algorithm were known and publicly criticised well before the algorithm became part of a formal standard endorsed by the ANSI, ISO, and formerly by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). One of the weaknesses publicly identified was the potential of the algorithm to harbour a cryptographic backdoor advantageous to those who know about it—the United States government's National Security Agency (NSA)—and no one else. In 2013, The New York Times reported that documents in their possession but never released to the public "appear to confirm" that the backdoor was real, and had been deliberately inserted by the NSA as part of its Bullrun decryption program. In December 2013, a Reuters news article alleged that in 2004, before NIST standardized Dual_EC_DRBG, NSA paid RSA Security $10 million in a secret deal to use Dual_EC_DRBG as the default in the RSA BSAFE cryptography library, which resulted in RSA Security becoming the most important distributor of the insecure algorithm. RSA responded that they "categorically deny" that they had ever knowingly colluded with the NSA to adopt an algorithm that was known to be flawed, but also stated, "We have never kept this relationship [with the NSA] a secret and in fact have openly publicized it."
I always wonder how hardware bugs like this happen with the sheer amount of hardware validation that's done. It'd be fascinating to know how it slipped through the cracks, though I know almost nothing about this side of the industry sadly
I'm getting 16-bit zeros on my Zen 3 chip (+1:3821, 0:3893, -1:3895), I will wait to get some statistically significant samples for the 32-bit values and update the forum thread. Maybe it was fixed after Zen 2?
So what? The point is to be non predictable not to pick all the numbers in the range with exactly the same probability. Would it be a problem if it never generated 16542?
By your argument, it would not be a problem if the RNG never generated 0. So, it must follow that it would also not be a problem if it never generated {1, 2, 3, ..., 253}.
That means that our RNG now only generates the values 254 and 255. Which of the values is generated is unpredictable on any given call. However, 7 of the 8 output bits are now always fixed and so completely predictable. Can you imagine how an attacker could exploit that?
Failing to generate only the number 0 is a weaker version of the same class of flaw.
Usually you do "rdrand % <some-number>" anyways, and in that case you will still get zeroes. True, your result might be skewed by 1/(maxint/some-number) but I guess that's not a big problem in practice
It is just possible they decided crypto code that uses it was safer to skip zeros. (Whist mathematically it should be no more likely; it is vastly more likely someone will actually try that key).
It is also possible that their code was generating too many zeros and the easiest fix was to discard them all.
Can you clarify what you mean by "it is vastly more likely someone will actually try that key"?
I'm guessing you don't think there are people calling rdrand in a loop and throwing away the output with high probability except when it is 0, but I can't see how else you imagine people would be vastly more likely to use the output when it is 0?
It takes entropy from multiple different sources, makes it all input to the XOF, then the XOF uses cryptography to output a stream that has as much entropy as the combined entropy of all of its sources of randomness. So if an XOF, for example, takes 100 runs of rdrand16, along with the system time in microseconds and the number of milliseconds between receiving 100 packets over the network, the XOF will output a completely random stream without artifacts like never returning 0x0000, even if rdrand16 never outputs 0x0000.
I fail to see why one should either rely on a single random source nor roll their own.
Do we now learn that they fixed "always generate all 1s" with "never generate all 0s"??
EDIT: I've been unable to reproduce the problem on my CPU, FWIW. It's a Ryzen 5 3600.
EDIT2: OK, update, I can reproduce it with rdrand16, rdrand32 is fine but rdrand16 can never generate all 0s. So my CPU does have this problem!
To prove it, we'd need to examine the chip and its microcode.
Most of the console hacking talks are great, both informative and entertaining.
Basically I'm wondering if it's a bug in the version of the instruction that writes to a 16-bit reg, or a bug in the underlying RNG
*: missed a word the first time around
" I am so glad I resisted pressure from Intel engineers to let /dev/random rely only on the RDRAND instruction. To quote from the article below:
"By this year, the Sigint Enabling Project had found ways inside some of the encryption chips that scramble information for businesses and governments, either by working with chipmakers to insert back doors...."
Relying solely on the hardware random number generator which is using an implementation sealed inside a chip which is impossible to audit is a BAD idea. "
https://web.archive.org/web/20180611180213/https://plus.goog...
Putting a backdoor into CSPRNG is a favored way to break crypto, for example Dual_EC_DRBG.
"
Weaknesses in the cryptographic security of the algorithm were known and publicly criticised well before the algorithm became part of a formal standard endorsed by the ANSI, ISO, and formerly by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). One of the weaknesses publicly identified was the potential of the algorithm to harbour a cryptographic backdoor advantageous to those who know about it—the United States government's National Security Agency (NSA)—and no one else. In 2013, The New York Times reported that documents in their possession but never released to the public "appear to confirm" that the backdoor was real, and had been deliberately inserted by the NSA as part of its Bullrun decryption program. In December 2013, a Reuters news article alleged that in 2004, before NIST standardized Dual_EC_DRBG, NSA paid RSA Security $10 million in a secret deal to use Dual_EC_DRBG as the default in the RSA BSAFE cryptography library, which resulted in RSA Security becoming the most important distributor of the insecure algorithm. RSA responded that they "categorically deny" that they had ever knowingly colluded with the NSA to adopt an algorithm that was known to be flawed, but also stated, "We have never kept this relationship [with the NSA] a secret and in fact have openly publicized it."
"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG
By your argument, it would not be a problem if the RNG never generated 0. So, it must follow that it would also not be a problem if it never generated {1, 2, 3, ..., 253}.
That means that our RNG now only generates the values 254 and 255. Which of the values is generated is unpredictable on any given call. However, 7 of the 8 output bits are now always fixed and so completely predictable. Can you imagine how an attacker could exploit that?
Failing to generate only the number 0 is a weaker version of the same class of flaw.
See section 7.3.17 of the Intel SDM, and how NIST SP800-90A (which the SDM refers to) defines "random number".
So it is not necessarily that it doesn't generate zero, they did not run enough times to increase the probability of actually generating a zero.
You definitely would expect a roughly equal number of 0s as any other of those numbers since it's uniformly distributed. And definitely not 0
They also write:
> Running the same programs on an Intel processor, and the 0's are there with no problem.
It is also possible that their code was generating too many zeros and the easiest fix was to discard them all.
I'm guessing you don't think there are people calling rdrand in a loop and throwing away the output with high probability except when it is 0, but I can't see how else you imagine people would be vastly more likely to use the output when it is 0?